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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2012, at a small surgical practice located outside of Chicago, an
employee tried to log into the practice’s secure server, but instead was greeted by an
odd message.1 The message stated that the data on the server, which included
thousands of individual electronic health records and confidential emails, had been
encrypted and could only be accessed by a password. 2 That password would be
provided, the message explained, for a fee.3
On June 25, 2012, the Surgeons of Lake County, located in Libertyville, Illinois,
became one of the latest victims of a growing phenomenon: electronic health record
extortion.4 The ploy is simple. A hacker gains access to a large store of personal
medical records on a “secure” server. 5 The hacker simply removes or encrypts the
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Press Release, Surgeons of Lake Cnty., LLC, Incident Triggers Investigation as to
Whether Patient Information May Have Been Improperly Accessed (July 20, 2012), available
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data, then holds it for ransom.6 The thief does not break windows, kick in doors, or
even have to leave the comfort of his own home. While sophisticated extortion
scams are still rare,7 they are sober reminders of the vulnerability of the highly
valuable and personal information patients share with their health care providers.
Over the last few years, adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) increased.8
In part, this is a result of increased pressure by regulators to adopt EHR technology
to improve the efficiency and quality of medical care. 9 In years to come, Medicare
and Medicaid reimbursement will be determined in part by the provider’s use or nonuse of EHR.10 In the twenty-first century, it seems unlikely that government
incentives would be necessary to spark interest in adopting new technology, but the
health care industry lags behind other industries in terms of electronic records
utilization.11 This is in part because of the unique character of the information
contained in medical records. Protected Health Information (PHI) carries a
substantial privacy interest because EHRs hold vast amounts of personal
information; not only is a patient’s private medical history at risk, but names,
addresses, birth dates, and social security numbers in electronic form are also
vulnerable.12 That private data is collected with thousands, sometimes millions, of
other patient records onto a single server.13 Many healthcare providers were reluctant
to place electronic Protected Health Information (ePHI) in what they perceived to be
the vulnerable, virtual realm. 14 Ironically, this delay in conversion might have made
ePHI even more susceptible.
6

Id.

7
Neil Versel, Cyber Crooks Target Healthcare for Financial Data, INFO. WK. (Oct. 24,
2012), http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/security-privacy/cyber-crooks-targethealthcare-for-finan/240009668.
8
Eric Jamoom et al., Physician Adoption of Electronic Health Record Systems: United
States, 2011, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db98.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
9

Health IT Regulations Meaningful Use Regulations, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.
healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/meaningful-use-regulations (last visited Aug. 4,
2014).
10

Id.

11

Julie Gray, Modernizing Healthcare Communication: Medical Information When and
Where You Need It, PEORIA MAG. (Feb. 2010), http://www.peoriamagazines.com/ibi/
2010/feb/modernizing-healthcare-communication.
12

What is the Difference Between a Personal Health Record, an Electronic Health
Record, and an Electronic Medical Record?, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/
patients-families/faqs/what-difference-between-personal-health-record-and-electronic-healthrecord-a (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
13

See generally Breaches Affecting 500 or More People, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.
hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breach tool.html (last visited
Aug. 4, 2014).
14

Vince Kuraitis, Overcoming the Penguin Problem: Setting Expectations for EHR
Adoption, E-CARE MGMT. BLOG (Aug. 2, 2009), http://e-caremanagement.com/overcomingthe-penguin-problem-setting-expectations-for-ehr-adoption/. Another issue, which compounds
the practical concerns, is the “penguin problem” that Kuraitis focuses on in this article. The
penguin problem is an economic phenomenon in which everyone in a given population waits
for someone to be the first to adopt a new method or technology, so no one adopts the new
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As the health care industry plays catch-up, it runs the risk of advancing too
quickly and falling prey to a highly sophisticated population of hackers. While
providers may feel the sting of regulators for failing to keep up with rapidly
advancing online security norms, it is the patients that are the real victims. The
breach at the Surgeons of Lake County was relatively small. 15 Only a little over
7,000 patient records were compromised in that case. 16 But the numbers can run
much higher. In March and April 2012, hackers breached the Utah Department of
Health servers and gained access to roughly 800,000 individual electronic health
records.17
The rapid adoption of EHRs, to store and communicate highly personal data,
raises serious concerns in terms of privacy, security, and civil and criminal liability.
This note will examine the current statutory framework for addressing electronic
breaches in the health care context, examine the vulnerabilities of EHRs, and look to
the established world of online banking for possible legislative and practical
solutions to the challenge of keeping private health information private. Finally, this
note will propose key amendments to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations to enhance authentication security.
II. BACKGROUND
Medical records are the principal repository for a patient’s health and health care
history.18 Traditionally, these records were paper documents that were passively
used by providers for historical reference.19 EHR technology provides capabilities
and improved efficiencies that paper records could never achieve. 20 The ability to
share patient information contained in EHRs promises to revolutionize the practice
of medicine by turning what was once a historical reference into a tool that can
proactively prevent harmful drug interactions and allergies, reduce the chances that a
clinician’s orders will be misread or illegible, and facilitate the coordination of care
across multiple providers.21
The many benefits of EHR technology are inherently counterbalanced by the
increased threat to patient privacy. As one scholar put it, “[a]s society has progressed
and grown to new digital heights . . . it also has become more vulnerable to
method or technology. Kuratsis suggests that this phenomenon is a reason for the health care
industry's slow adoption of EHR technology.
15
Health Information Privacy for the Surgeons of Lake County, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotification
rule/breachtool.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (search “Surgeons of Lake County;” enter for
state “Illinois;” then apply filter).
16

Id.

17

See HEALTHIT.GOV, supra note 13; see also, Patty Henetz, Utah Health Dept Chief:
Hacked Data Stored Too Long, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 3, 2012), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/
news/54037017-78/health-security-department-patton.html.csp.
18
Eric S. Pasternack, HIPAA in the Age of Electronic Health Records, 41 RUTGERS L.J.
817, 818 (2010).
19

Id.

20

Id. at 819.

21

Id.at 81921.
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unwanted intrusions of privacy.”22 These intrusions negatively impact patient
confidence in their providers’ ability to secure their private data. 23 A survey by the
National Partnership for Women and Families found that fifty-nine percent of
patients who see a doctor that uses EHR technology feel that widespread adoption of
EHR technology will lead to more personal information being lost or stolen. 24
The level of trust and comfort a patient has with his clinician has a direct
relationship with the quality of care the patient receives. 25 A breach of trust between
a patient and clinician can result in irreparable physical harm to the patient. 26 The
amount of information a patient is willing to disclose to his or her clinician can
impact the accuracy of diagnoses and the course of treatment recommended. 27 Thus,
patient/clinician trust is not just beneficial to quality care, but essential.
A. The Role of HIPAA
Congress recognized the importance of patient information security to health care
through the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). 28
Despite its nebulous label, HIPAA’s most well-known provisions address the
privacy and security of patient health information (PHI). 29 The HIPAA privacy rule
has three major purposes:
1. To protect and enhance the rights of consumers by providing them
access to their health information and controlling the inappropriate use of
that information; 2. To improve the quality of health care in the United
States by restoring trust in the health care system among consumers,
health care professionals, and the multitude of organizations and
individuals committed to the delivery of care; and 3. To improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery by creating a national
framework for health privacy protection that builds on efforts by states,
health systems, and individual organizations and individuals.30
These purposes are achieved by establishing a demanding federal standard for the
electronic maintenance and storage of PHI.31 The Act applies only to “covered
22

Varick D. Love, Privacy Ethics in Health Care, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE,
JulyAug. 2011, at 15.
23

Id. at 17.

24

Press Release, Nat’l P’ship for Women & Families, Making IT Meaningful: How
Consumers Value and Trust Health IT is Unprecedented (Feb. 15, 2012), available at
http://www. nationalpartnership.org/news-room/press-releases/with-governmentproviding.html.
25

Audiey C. Kao et al., Patients’ Trust in their Physicians, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 681
(1998), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1500897/.
26

Love, supra note 22, at 17.

27

Id.

28

Pasternack, supra note 18, at 818.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 825 n.71.

31

Id.
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entities” which include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care
providers that transmit PHI in electronic form. 32 The general rule set forth by
HIPAA is that covered entities must obtain patient authorization before releasing
PHI. However, this otherwise simple rule is complicated by numerous exceptions
that permit, or even compel, disclosure, even in the absence of such authorization. 33
Notably, HIPAA does not provide patients with a private cause of action for
unlawful disclosure of PHI, but is instead enforced through civil and criminal
proceedings originated by the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Department of Justice.34
Given the narrow scope and limited remedies provided in HIPAA, it has been
criticized for focusing too much on patient consent and ignoring the technological
realities presented by a growing number of non-covered entities that maintain
electronic PHI.35 These criticisms may explain why Congress took additional action
in 2009 through the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act (HITECH).36
B. HITECH Amendments to HIPAA
HITECH had two overarching purposes: (1) to incentivize the adoption of health
information technology, including EHRs, and (2) to increase the privacy and security
protections originally provided in HIPAA.37 To this end, HITECH makes federal
funds immediately available to providers to help pay for EHR technology and to
conduct training and education to develop the “best practices” of EHR utilization. 38
On the security side, the Act obligates covered entities to disclose breaches of EHRs
to the individuals affected.39 A breach occurs when unsecured PHI is acquired,
32

Id. at 82627.

33

Id. at 827.

34
Id. at 828, 83138, 84041. While HIPAA does not expressly provide a private cause of
action, it has been successfully used for establishing a standard of care in tort claims for
invasion of privacy, breach of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See
Acosta v. Byrum, 638 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2006).
35

Pasternack, supra note 18, at 827.

36

See generally HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj, §§ 17901 (2012).

37

Lisa L. Dahm, Carrots and Sticks in the HITECH Act: Should Covered Entities Panic?,
22 HEALTH LAW 1 (Aug. 2010).
38

Id. at 3.

39

Id at 4. As Dahm explains, once a covered entity discovers that a breach has occurred, it
must notify the individuals whose PHI is involved “without unreasonable delay and in no case
later than 60 [sixty] calendar days.” Notice must be provided in writing and sent via first-class
mail to each individual's last known address and must include:
(1) A brief description of what happened, including the date of breach and the date of
the discovery of the breach, if known; (2) A description of the types of unsecured
protected health information that were involved in the breach (such as full name,
Social Security number, date of birth, home address, account number, or disability
code); (3) The steps individuals should take to protect themselves from potential harm
resulting from the breach; (4) A brief description of what the covered entity involved
is doing to investigate the breach, mitigate losses, and protect against any further
breaches; (5) Contact procedures for individuals to ask questions or learn additional
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accessed, used, or disclosed by an unauthorized individual and the privacy or
security of the PHI is, or may be, compromised.40 HITECH also requires covered
entities’ business associates to comply with HIPAA security regulations. 41
HITECH still does not provide for a private cause of action to those affected by
data breaches; however, it does permit a state attorney general to bring a civil action
on behalf of state residents to enjoin a violation of HITECH and to obtain statutory
damages on behalf of affected residents. 42 Generally, while HITECH provides some
enhanced penalties43 and expands liability under the act to business associates and
employees of covered entities, the Act is still narrowly tailored and forces affected
individuals to rely on action by federal and state regulators to seek remedies for
breaches of EHRs.44
C. HIPAA: The Final Rule
On January 17, 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services released the
long-awaited HIPAA final rule.45 The new rule officially adopted many of the
changes called for in HITECH and the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act
of 2008.46 According to HHS, the final rule “greatly enhances a patient’s privacy
protections, provides individuals new rights to their health information, and
strengthens the government’s ability to enforce the law”. 47 The final rule became
effective on March 23, 2013, but covered entities and their business associates had
until September 23, 2013, to come into full compliance with its new requirements. 48
Among the final rule’s most prominent features is the complete replacement
of the Breach Notification rule as set forth in the interim final rule, the extension of
information, which shall include a toll-free telephone number, an email address, web
site, or postal address. Id.
40

Id.

41

Id.

42

See HITECH Act, Section 13410(e)(1)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17939(e)(1) (2012)).

43

See HITECH Act, Section 13410(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17939(a) (2012)).

44

Devin D.Vinson, No More Paper Tiger: Promise and Peril as HIPAA Goes HITECH,
30 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 28 (2011).
45
Press release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. New rule protects patient privacy,
secures health information (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2013pres/01/20130117b.html. A final rule is obtained after a proposed rule is put forth by a
regulatory agency. Proposed rules are subjected to public comment from a variety of
stakeholders. Those public comments are reviewed by the administrative agency and any
suggestions for modification of the rule contained in those comments are considered and
sometimes adopted in the final rule.
46

Id. The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) provides
individuals with increased protection against disclosure of genetic information and
specifically prohibits the use or disclosure of genetic information by health insurers for
underwriting purposes. Final rule provisions related to GINA do not alter or add to technical
security safeguards and thus are not relevant to this article.
47

Id.

48

Id.
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liability for breaches to business associates and the dramatic increase in civil
monetary penalties.49 The final rule provides the following summary of its major
provisions:
“This omnibus final rule is comprised of the following four final rules:
1. Final modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement
Rules mandated by the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, and certain other modifications to
improve the Rules, which were issued as a proposed rule on July 14,
2010. These modifications:
Make business associates of covered entities directly liable for
compliance with certain of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules'
requirements.
Strengthen the limitations on the use and disclosure of protected
health information for marketing and fundraising purposes, and prohibit
the sale of protected health information without individual authorization.
Expand individuals' rights to receive electronic copies of their health
information and to restrict disclosures to a health plan concerning
treatment for which the individual has paid out of pocket in full.
Require modifications to, and redistribution of, a covered entity's
notice of privacy practices.
Modify the individual authorization and other requirements to
facilitate research and disclosure of child immunization proof to schools,
and to enable access to decedent information by family members or
others.
Adopt the additional HITECH Act enhancements to the Enforcement
Rule not previously adopted in the October 30, 2009, interim final rule
(referenced immediately below), such as the provisions addressing
enforcement of noncompliance with the HIPAA Rules due to willful
neglect.
2. Final rule adopting changes to the HIPAA Enforcement Rule to
incorporate the increased and tiered civil money penalty structure
provided by the HITECH Act, originally published as an interim final rule
on October 30, 2009.
3. Final rule on Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health
Information under the HITECH Act, which replaces the breach
notification rule's “harm” threshold with a more objective standard and
supplants an interim final rule published on August 24, 2009.
4. Final rule modifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule as required by the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) to prohibit most
health plans from using or disclosing genetic information for underwriting
purposes, which was published as a proposed rule on October 7, 2009.”50
III. DISCUSSION
HIPAA seems far removed from the practical realities of modern EHR
utilization. While attacks on health care entities are still relatively rare, hackers are
49

78 C.F.R. § 5566 (2013).

50

Id.
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stealing ePHI at an ever increasing rate, leaving patients vulnerable to identity theft
and, perhaps more importantly, loss of control over highly sensitive Protected Health
Information.51 The threat posed by hackers is a symptom of institutional security
failure.52 Hackers gain access to PHI through system vulnerabilities. 53 As a security
issue, examination of these issues requires careful analysis of the HIPAA Security
Rule and, more specifically, the technical standards it requires. In order to
understand how to better protect ePHI, it is first necessary to understand the nature
of the threat and the current required safeguards. The remedy will be found where
current safeguards fail to address the threat.
A. The Nature of the Threat
In recent months, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has expressed
concerns that the health care systems present an inviting target to activist hackers,
cyber warriors, criminals, and terrorists.54 DHS has found that the same type of
trivial security flaws which hackers have exploited in the financial, defense, and
private business sectors still exist in the health care industry and are going
uncorrected.55
Not only are there a swarm of foreign and domestic hackers threatening all forms
of electronic data, but there are several new ways to remotely access that data. 56 Cell
phones, laptops, and tablets have become popular tools in the health care field. 57 For
example, the Apple iPad features an electronic charting application called
51
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Health-Care Sector Vulnerable to Hackers, Researchers Say,
WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/health-caresector-vulnerable-to-hackers-researchers-say/2012/12/25/72933598-3e50-11e2-ae43cf491b837f7b_story.html (This article was the culmination of a year-long investigation by the
Washington Post. The investigators determined that the health care industry is among the most
vulnerable industries in terms of cyber security. Avi Rubin, a computer scientist and technical
director of the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University, told the
Washington Post “[i]f our financial industry regarded security the way the health-care sector
does, I would stuff my cash in a mattress under my bed.”).
52

Id.

53

HEALTHIT.GOV, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND
SECURITY OF HEALTH INFORMATION 13, http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/privacy/
privacy-and-security-guide.pdf.
54

Id.

55

Id.

56

See Abigail Philips, Microsoft Surface Enters mHealth Market, HEALTHCARE GLOBAL
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.healthcareglobal.com/healthcare_technology/microsoft-surfaceenters-mhealth-market; see also Scott Mace, How Tablets are Influencing Healthcare,
HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (March 6, 2013), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-2/TEC289831/How-Tablets-are-Influencing-Healthcare.
57
See Eric Wicklund, mHealth in the Exhibit Hall: It’s No Longer All About the Shiny
New Toys, HEALTHCAREIT NEWS (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/
news/mhealth-exhibit-hall-its-no-longer-all-about-shiny-new-toys; see generally Susan
Standing & Craig Standing, Mobile Technology and Healthcare: The Adoption Issues and
Systemic Problems, 4 INT’L J. ELECTRONIC HEALTH CARE 221, 22135 (2008), available at
http://inderscience.metapress.com/content/071725p701448111/.
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“DrChrono” which its developer claims meets Stage-1 Meaningful Use under
HITECH.58 The application allows providers to transmit medical billing information,
transmit electronic prescriptions, and share EKG, X-Ray, and lab results all from the
iPad.59 These portable devices are certainly more convenient and provide users with
numerous benefits that have the potential to improve the quality of care, but as soon
as these devices come out hackers develop new ways to subvert their security
measures.60 The answer can’t be to abandon these new technologies, but rather to
make them more secure with improved security standards that are already
implemented in other industries.
While it is nearly impossible to stop a sophisticated hacker who is determined to
gain access to a healthcare network, many of the current security practices in place
are so sub-standard that even a hacker with relatively low-skill can gain access. The
University of Chicago Medical Center, for example, found that multiple resident
physicians were using a single password to access an online dropbox used to manage
patient care.61 Worse still, the password was published in an online manual. 62 After
the media brought the vulnerability to the medical center’s attention, it took steps to
resolve the problem.63 Unfortunately, the Office of Civil Rights website is filled with
examples of such vulnerabilities which are being discovered too late.64
Even by curing this low hanging fruit through improved administrative security
measures, the threat from more sophisticated attacks remains. In the Information
Age, these threats come from around the globe. 65 They can even be highly
coordinated among multiple hackers as demonstrated by the now famous hacking
organization known as “Anonymous” which uses social media and websites to plan
large scale attacks on various businesses, groups, and governments.66
Protecting ePHI from these hackers is a constant technological arms race. As
quickly as new cutting edge barriers are put up, someone is figuring out how to tear

58

See DRCHRONO INC., https://drchrono.com/ipad_ehr/ (last visited March 7, 2013).

59

Id.

60

See, e.g., Nate Hoffelder, Got 5 Seconds? Why Not Hack an IPad 2, MEDIA BISTRO
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.mediabistro.com/appnewser/got-5-seconds-why-not-hack-anipad-2_b17008.
61

O’Harrow, supra note 51.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

The HIPAA final rule, published by HHS on January 18, 2013, incorporates the
HITECH Act’s mandatory breach notification for breaches of ePHI that affect 500 or more
patients. A running list of these breaches is published in accordance with section 13402(e)(4)
of the HITECH Act and is available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/
breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html.
65
Cyber Threat Warnings Grow Louder, FCW (Aug. 15, 2012), http://fcw.com/articles/
2012/08/15/buzz-cyber-threat.aspx?m=2.
66

James Schmidt, What is ‘Anonymous’?, EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://www.examiner.com/article/what-is-anonymous.
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them down.67 At the same time healthcare IT professionals are trying to keep
unauthorized users out, there is a growing trend toward making electronic medical
records available to patients online.68
B. The Value of the Threatened Information
Part of the reason ePHI is so sensitive is that it may contain details about a
person’s health history and that information might be embarrassing or be perceived
to negatively impact the person’s ability to gain employment or insurance, but one of
the primary reasons hackers target EHRs is for financial information. 69 Hackers are
looking for information from which they can directly or indirectly profit. 70 HIPAA
provides a detailed list of the sort of information that must be removed or redacted
from EHRs in order to consider the record “de-identified.”71 De-identification is not
at issue in this note, but the list does illustrate the range of information often found
in EHRs. The list includes:
(A) Names;
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes,
except for the initial three digits of a zip code if, according to the current
publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census:
(1) The geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes with the same
three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and
(2) The initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic units
containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000.
(C) All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an
individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of
death; and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates (including year)
indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may be
aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older;
(D) Telephone numbers;
67

Richard Barber, Managing X-Commerce: The Importance of a Security Based
Architecture When Preparing for E-Commerce, May 2001, at 912, available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353485801005141#.
68

See Pasternack, supra note 18; see also Steve Lohr, Google to End Health Records
Service After it Fails to Attract Users, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/06/25/technology/25health.html?_r=0. Google Health was a major attempt by a
prominent developer to provide patients with online access to ePHI. Launched in 2008, the
goal of the service was to translate their consumer-centered approach, which was successfully
applied to other domains, to the health care industry and to impact the day-to-day health
experiences of its users. Despite nearly three years of effort and the strength of its brand,
Google Health was abandoned in the beginning of 2012. The complexity of the service and
the laborious task of putting health information into the system discouraged wide adoption,
and the service failed to have the large impact the company had envisioned. Still, it seems
inevitable that consumer-driven EHRs will find a place in the market and become as
ubiquitous as online banking.
69

Versel, supra note 7.

70

45 CFR § 164.514(d)(2)(i) (2013).

71

Id.
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(E) Fax numbers;
(F) Electronic mail addresses;
(G) Social security numbers;
(H) Medical record numbers;
(I) Health plan beneficiary numbers;
(J) Account numbers;
(K) Certificate/license numbers;
(L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate
numbers;
(M) Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(O) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(P) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
(Q) Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and
(R) Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except
as permitted by paragraph (c) of this section;
Valuable financial data is often what draws hackers to healthcare records, but
health and financial information is often not segmented from other types of
information.72 In other words, patients who have their EHRs hacked run the risk of
not only having their identity stolen, but also of having their private medical history
compromised. The value of personal medical history extends even beyond the
individual whose ePHI has been exposed by a breach due to the genetic information
that can often be found in those records.73
C. HIPAA Security Requirements
In this fast moving environment, slow-moving and narrowly tailored regulation is
a poor defensive strategy. Instead, HHS created rules based on the fundamental
concepts of flexibility, scalability, and technology neutrality. 74 HIPAA does not
identify specific security measures to implement, but a covered entity is permitted to
use any security measures that allow it to “reasonably and appropriately” implement
72

Versel, supra note 7.

73
Kristen Carl, It’s Personal: Privacy Concerns Associated with Personal Health
Records, 5 I/S: A J. L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 533 (2010). As Carl elucidates,

[m]edical records arguably contain a person's most sensitive and private information.
Because many medical conditions are hereditary, a single medical record may include
equally sensitive information about countless other individuals. The damaging effects
brought on by a breach in the security of this information are endless. Third parties employers, bankers, neighbors - could use this information to discriminate against and
potentially ostracize an individual diagnosed with an “unpopular” disease or
condition. With the development and rising popularity of the online “personal health
record” through mediums such as Google Health and Microsoft HealthVault, two
important questions arise: (1) is storing medical information online safe and securely
protected; and, (2) in the event of a breach, whom does the law hold accountable?
Id.
74
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Security Standards: Technical Safeguards,
HIPAA SECURITY SERIES, May 2005 (rev. March 2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/techsafeguards.pdf
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the standards and implementation specifications.75 These regulations are set forth in
the HIPAA Security Rule.76 Whether a particular measure is “reasonable and
appropriate” is determined through a multi-factor analysis provided in the security
rule.77 The factors include:
(i) The size, complexity, and capabilities of the covered entity.
(ii) The covered entity's technical infrastructure, hardware, and software
security capabilities.
(iii) The costs of security measures.
(iv) The probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic
protected health information. 78
HIPAA appears to, and was in fact designed to, permit substantial discretion on
the part of the covered entity in determining what specific measures to take. 79 Of
course, once a breach occurs this lack of direction makes the covered entity’s task of
defending its security measures that much more complex and arbitrary. 80 If the
covered entity is able to determine that it is subject to the required implementations
based on this nebulous multi-factor test, then it must implement the equally

75

Id.

76

45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (2013). This rule provides in relevant part:

(a) General requirements. Covered entities must do the following: (1) Ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health information
the covered entity creates, receives, maintains, or transmits; (2) Protect against any
reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such
information; (3) Protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of such
information that are not permitted or required under subpart E of this part. (4) Ensure
compliance with this subpart by its workforce.
77

45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2) (2013).

78

Id.

79

45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2013).

80

Farrokh Alemi, Privacy and Confidentiality, HEALTH SYSTEMS ADMIN.,
http://gunston.gmu.edu/healthscience/740/HIPAA.asp?E=0 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
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enigmatic administrative,81 physical,82 and technical83 safeguards as well as
organizational,84 policies, procedures, and documentation85 requirements.
The administrative safeguards require the covered entity to conduct an “accurate
and thorough” risk analysis.86 Covered entities must then address those risks through

81
45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2013) describes the administrative safeguards and implementation
procedures a covered entity must enact including risk analysis, security management
processes, sanction policies, information system activity reviews, and workforce security,
among many others. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2013). Consult 45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2013) for a
full list of requirements.
82

45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2013) describes the physical safeguards and implementation
procedures a covered entity must enact including facility access controls, device and media
controls, disposal policies, and data backup and storage policies. 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2013).
83

45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2013) describes the technical safeguards and implementation
procedures a covered entity must enact including unique user identification, automatic logoff,
emergency access procedures, and audit controls, among many others. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312
(2013) .
84

45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (2013) sets forth the organizational requirements for covered
entities and their relationships with agents, employees, governmental entities, and other
parties. 45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (2013).
85

45 C.F.R. § 164.316 (2013).

A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306:
(a) Standard: Policies and procedures. Implement reasonable and appropriate policies
and procedures to comply with the standards, implementation specifications, or other
requirements of this subpart, taking into account those factors specified in §
164.306(b)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). This standard is not to be construed to permit or
excuse an action that violates any other standard, implementation specification, or
other requirements of this subpart. A covered entity may change its policies and
procedures at any time, provided that the changes are documented and are
implemented in accordance with this subpart.
(b)(1) Standard: Documentation.
(i) Maintain the policies and procedures implemented to comply with this subpart in
written (which may be electronic) form; and
(ii) If an action, activity or assessment is required by this subpart to be documented,
maintain a written (which may be electronic) record of the action, activity, or
assessment.
(2) Implementation specifications:
(i) Time limit (Required). Retain the documentation required by paragraph (b)(1) of
this section for 6 years from the date of its creation or the date when it last was in
effect, whichever is later.
(ii) Availability (Required). Make documentation available to those persons
responsible for implementing the procedures to which the documentation pertains.
(iii) Updates (Required). Review documentation periodically, and update as needed, in
response to environmental or operational changes affecting the security of the
electronic protected health information.
45 C.F.R. § 164.316 (2013).
86

45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2013). Specifically, the risk analysis is limited to
potential vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI. Id.
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the implementation of “sufficient” security measures,87 and apply an “appropriate”
sanction policy to its workforce in the event of non-compliance with the covered
entity's security policies and procedures.88 Finally, the covered entity must conduct
“regular” reviews of its information systems activity, including audit logs, access
reports, and security incident tracking reports.89
Physical safeguards require the covered entity to limit access to electronic
information systems to authorized users through policies and procedures regarding
use and receipt and removal of electronically stored data, as well as physical
safeguards.90 Specifically, the covered entity must implement policies and
procedures for disposal and removal of PHI prior to media re-use.91
The technical safeguards required of a covered entity include the access controls
for ePHI, such as unique user identification and a procedure for obtaining access to
ePHI in the event of an emergency.92 Covered entities must also implement audit
controls which record and examine user activity with ePHI93 and policies and
procedures which prevent the unauthorized alteration or destruction of PHI. 94 Person
or entity authentication procedures are required to ensure that the person or entity
seeking access is actually authorized.95 Finally, the covered entity is required to
implement technical safeguards to ensure the secure transmission of ePHI over a
communications network.96
The organizational requirements under HIPAA require a contractual agreement
between a covered entity and business associate. 97 The terms of that agreement bind
the business associate to the same security and privacy standards as the covered
entity.98 Notably, under these organizational requirements the covered entity is
87

45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (2013). Sufficiency in this case is determined by the application
of general requirements outlined in 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a).
88

45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) (2013).

89

45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) (2013).

90

45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(1) (2013).

91

45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2) (2013). An example of re-useable media is a re-writable
compact disk or flash drive. In order for these items to be re-used, existing PHI must be
removed to ensure existing ePHI is not needlessly disclosed when the media device is re-used.
92
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a) (2013). Access control requirements under the technical
safeguard provisions must limit access to those who are granted access rights as specified in
45 C.F.R. §164.308(a)(4).
93

45 C.F.R. § 164.312(b) (2013).

94

45 C.F.R. § 164.312(c)(1) (2013).

95

45 C.F.R. § 164.312(d) (2013).

96

45 C.F.R. § § 164.312(e)(1) (2013).

97

45 C.F.R. § 164.314(a)(1) (2013).

98

Id. Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of
2009, which amended HIPAA, a business associate of a covered entity is held to HIPAA
standards regardless of the terms or even existence of a written agreement. This rule was also
adopted in the HIPAA final rule released on Jan. 17, 2013. See Modifications to the HIPAA
Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the HITECH Act and
the GINA, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013). The rule explains the analysis for determining if
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considered to be in violation if the business associate breaches the contract by failing
to meet those standards and the covered entity fails to take “reasonable” steps to cure
that breach.99
Finally, the covered entity is required to implement certain policy, procedure,
and documentation standards.100 Consistent with the rest of the regulation, the
policies and procedures implemented must be “reasonable and appropriate” for the
covered entity to remain in compliance. 101 All policies and procedures must be
documented and maintained for no less than six years from the date of their creation
or the date when they were put into effect, whichever is later. 102 The documents must
then be made available to the persons responsible for implementation and updated in
response to any environmental and operational changes that affect the security of
ePHI.103

an agent meets a business associate standard as follows, “[a]n analysis of whether a business
associate is an agent will be fact specific, taking into account the terms of a business associate
agreement as well as the totality of the circumstances involved in the ongoing relationship
between the parties.” Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the HITECH Act and the GINA, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013).
99

45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(1)(ii) (2013).

(ii) A covered entity is not in compliance with the standards in § 164.502(e) and
paragraph (a) of this section if the covered entity knew of a pattern of an activity or
practice of the business associate that constituted a material breach or violation of the
business associate's obligation under the contract or other arrangement, unless the
covered entity took reasonable steps to cure the breach or end the violation, as
applicable, and, if such steps were unsuccessful-(A) Terminated the contract or arrangement, if feasible; or
(B) If termination is not feasible, reported the problem to the Secretary.
Id.
100

45 C.F.R. § 164.316 (2013).

101

Id. The reasonableness is determined through the flexibility approach set forth in 45
C.F.R. § 164.306(b):
(b) Flexibility of approach.
(1) Covered entities may use any security measures that allow the covered entity to
reasonably and appropriately implement the standards and implementation
specifications as specified in this subpart.
(2) In deciding which security measures to use, a covered entity must take into
account the following factors:
(i) The size, complexity, and capabilities of the covered entity.
(ii) The covered entity's technical infrastructure, hardware, and software security
capabilities.
(iii) The costs of security measures.
(iv) The probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic protected health
information.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2013).
102

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.316(a)(1)(ii)164.316(b)(2)(1) (2013).

103

45 C.F.R. § 164.316(b)(2) (2013).
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The Security Rule measures paint a rough outline for covered entities to follow.
That outline is further complimented by a myriad of so-called “addressable”104
measures.105 The addressable measures are not required unless an assessment by the
covered entity reveals the measures to be “reasonable and appropriate”106 in the
entity’s environment when analyzed with reference to the likely contribution to the
protection of ePHI.107 Among those “addressable” measures is the requirement to
have ePHI encrypted whenever it is transmitted electronically. 108 The standard
provided within the technical safeguard requirements is merely to implement
“technical measures” to guard against unauthorized access of ePHI.109
When HITECH was unveiled as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, it provided additional actions by covered entities once a
breach had occurred, but HITECH did not require the implementation of more
rigorous initial security measures than were required originally under HIPAA. 110
Although, the new rules under HITECH did impose substantially harsher civil and
criminal penalties for covered entities whose non-compliance results in breaches of
ePHI.111
D. Federal Security Standards in the Financial Industry
Electronic banking information carries a similar expectation of privacy to ePHI
and can offer guidance in formatting a workable security standard. Like the health
care industry, the financial industry requires the electronic storage and regular
transfer of confidential information among various entities. 112 A key difference
between the two industries is that the financial services industry is leaps and bounds
ahead of the health care industry in terms of remote access and management of
personal financial information.113
Online security standards in the financial services industry are promulgated by
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), an interagency
council that is charged with producing standards and guidance for electronic
financial data security.114 FFIEC was created as part of the Federal Institutions
104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3)(i) (2013).

108

45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2013).

109

45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2013).

110

Howard Anderson, HITECH Stage 2 Rules Unveiled, DATA BREACH TODAY (Aug. 23,
2012), http://www.databreachtoday.com/hitech-stage-2-rules-unveiled-a-5060.
111

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 160; 45 C.F.R. § 164.

112

O’Harrow, supra note 51.

113

Id.

114

Paul Rice, Civil Liability Theories For Insufficient Security Authentication in Online
Banking, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 439, 442 (2012). As Rice explains,
The financial services sector falls under a complex web of federal and state
regulations designed to govern operations and customer information protection. At the
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Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act in March of 1979. 115 The agencies
represented by the council are the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 116
In 1999, The FFIEC implemented section 501(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act. This section required FFIEC member agencies to:
establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to
their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards (1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer
records and information; (2) to protect against any anticipated threats or
hazards to the security or integrity of such records; and (3) to protect
against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any
customer.117
In response to this general call for action, the FFIEC developed security
standards similar to those provided in HIPAA. The FFIEC “IT Examination
highest level, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System sets the overall
monetary policy for the United States. The activities of a financial services company
determine which regulatory body provides oversight. A bank will often fall under
several regulatory programs based on the bank's charter and services it offers.
Different federal agencies regulate banks offering traditional checking and savings
accounts depending on the nature of the bank's charter. Nationally chartered banks fall
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the
Comptroller for Currency (OCC). Credit unions and state chartered banks fall under
the review National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The FDIC insures deposits
held in traditional personal checking and savings accounts.
Id.
115
About the FFIEC, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm.
116

Id.

117

15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). This section provides in relevant part,

[i]t is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security
and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal information.
(b) Financial institutions safeguards
In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a) of this section, each agency or authority
described in section 6805(a) of this title, other than the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, shall establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to
their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical safeguards-(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information;
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of
such records; and
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.
Id.
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Handbook” details those standards and sets forth a multi-step security process to
identify and address security needs within a financial institution based on its
resources.118 Among those are a series of security controls comparable to the
administrative, physical, and technical safeguards provided in HIPAA. 119 However,
there are a number of key differences from which the health care industry may be
able to glean valuable lessons for improving security without impeding access.
One of the key distinctions is in the area of user authentication. In 2001, the
FFIEC published a new set of guidelines for the financial services industry titled
“Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment.”120 This initial guidance
focused on risk management controls necessary to authenticate the identity of retail
and commercial customers accessing internet-based financial services.121 Changing
law and technology, paired with increasing instances of fraud and identity theft from
data breaches, prompted the council to update its authentication guidance in 2005. 122
The guidance reiterated its previous risk assessment framework, but also took an
important leap in explaining what type of user authentication protections will be
considered sufficient.123
The FFIEC determined that single factor authentication was no longer sufficient
protection.124 Single factor authentication is the practice of authenticating the
identity of a user using only a username and password. 125 The FFIEC guidelines now
require institutions to use a three-factor methodology: something the user knows
(e.g., a password), something the user has (e.g., an ATM or debit card), and
something the user is (e.g., a biometric feature like a fingerprint or retinal scan).126
The guidelines require the implementation of at least two of the three to meet

118

FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK: INFORMATION
SECURITY (2006), available at http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/ITBooklets/FFIEC_ITBooklet_
InformationSecurity.pdf. The process includes several steps: risk assessment, security strategy
development, security controls implementation, security monitoring, and security process
monitoring and updating. This detailed security process provides guidance to financial
institutions with a clear road for determining what safeguards should be implemented to
ensure the security of customer information. However, since it is only designed to evaluate a
single entity’s unique security needs, a full overview is omitted from this Note.
119

Id. at 4.

120

FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN INTERNET BANKING
ENVIRONMENT, available at http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf.
121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Rice, supra note 114, at 445.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 44546.
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compliance standards.127 Further, the multi-factor authentication cannot feature two
steps from the same category. 128
Guidance literature regarding HIPAA authentication standards demonstrates a
clear preference for three-factor methodology, but falls short of actually requiring
that methodology to be used when accessing ePHI.129 Multi-factor authentication
plays a key role in ePHI security as simple password protection is so easily
usurped.130 The lack of a hard rule requiring multi-factor authentication only makes
ePHI a more alluring target for savvy hackers who know that huge stores of valuable
health and financial information are just a string of characters away. Thus, as
financial institutions apply layered authentication, hospital and insurance networks
may make for more vulnerable prey.
The FFIEC also recommends the use of a highly sophisticated authentication
system called Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).131 The FFIEC handbook describes
PKI as follows:
The system is based on public key cryptography in which each user has a
key pair-a unique electronic value called a public key and a
mathematically related private key. The public key is made available to
those who need to verify the user’s identity.
The private key is stored on the user's computer or a separate device
such as a smart card. When the key pair is created with strong encryption
127

Id. at 446.

128

Id. For example, an authentication process which required a user to enter a user name
and password and then answer a personal question would not be sufficient protection under
these standards.
129

Security Standards, supra note 74, at 9. This HHS publication states,

[i]n general, authentication ensures that a person is in fact who he or she claims to be
before being allowed to access EPHI. This is accomplished by providing proof of
identity. There are a few basic ways to provide proof of identity for authentication. A
covered entity may:
i.
Require something known only to that individuals, such as a password or PIN.
ii.
Require something that the individuals possess, such as a smart car, a token, or a
key.
iii. Require something unique to the individual such as a biometric. Examples of
biometrics include fingerprints, voice patterns, facial patterns or iris patterns.
Most covered entities use one of the first two methods of authentication. Many small
provider offices rely on a password or PIN to authenticate the user. If the
authentication credentials entered into an information system math those stored in that
system, the user is authenticated. Once Properly Authenticated, the user is granted the
authorized access privileges to perform functions and access EPHI. Although the
password is the most common way to obtain authentication in an information system
and the easiest to establish, covered entities may want to explore other authentication
methods.
Id.
130
Matt Honan, Kill the Password: Why a String of Characters Can’t Protect Us Anymore,
WIRED MAG. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/11/ff-mat-honanpassword-hacker/all/.
131

FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 26.
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algorithms and input variables, the probability of deriving the private key
from the public key is extremely remote. The private key must be stored
in encrypted text and protected with a password or PIN to avoid
compromise or disclosure. The private key is used to create an electronic
identifier called adigital signature that uniquely identifies the holder of the
private key and can only be authenticated with the corresponding public
key.
The certificate authority (CA), which may be the financial institution
or its service provider, plays a key role by attesting with a digital
certificate that a particular public key and the corresponding private key
belongs to a specific user or system. It is important when issuing a digital
certificate that the registration process for initially verifying the identity
of users is adequately controlled. The CA attests to the individual user's
identity by signing the digital certificate with its own private key, known
as the root key. Each time the user establishes a communication link with
the financial institution's systems, a digital signature is transmitted with a
digital certificate. These electronic credentials enable the institution to
determine that the digital certificate is valid, identify the individual as a
user, and confirm that transactions entered into the institution's computer
system were performed by that user. 132
The complexity of the PKI framework is what makes it such a highly effective
security measure.133 The main benefit of PKI is that it allows for the secure access of
data on a public network and reliably identifies the user accessing the data.134 Of
course, the implementation of such complex authentication security measures raises
one of the fundamental issues of electronic data security: the trade-offs.135 The
reality of increased security is that it almost always comes at the cost of
convenience.136 In the health care context, where time is often of the essence,
inconvenience can quickly escalate into a danger to the patient’s health.137 So, the
security rules for both financial institutions and health care entities are drafted to
allow for some flexibility by requiring each entity to conduct a risk assessment to
determine the most reasonable security measures given the entity’s risks and

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

CARLISLE ADAMS & STEVE LLOYD, UNDERSTANDING PKI: CONCEPTS, STANDARDS, AND
DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 11–15 (2003).
135

Honan, supra note 130.

136

Id.

137

Michael J. Schull at al., The Effect of Low-Complexity Patients on Emergency
Department Wait Times, 49 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 257 (2007), available at
http://www.camconnect.org/member/documents/LowComplexityER.pdf.
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resources.138 This flexibility has been criticized by entities looking for more concrete
answers to the ever-present question: what are the expectations?139
A perfect example of the necessity of a flexible standard is regulation on
encryption measures. Encryption utilizes a fixed algorithm to convert electronic data
into an incomprehensible code that can only be broken with the use of a variable
known as a “key.”140 The FFIEC recognizes the following three types of encryption:
the cryptographic hash, symmetric encryption, and asymmetric encryption. 141
Cryptographic hash encryption encodes data by reducing the variable length of
input data into a fixed length input data. 142 Hashes are placed in the code and used to
verify the file and message integrity. 143 A cryptographic hash system also uses
hashes to encrypt the password that activates the key to unlock the code. 144 Of
course, this is not a perfect system and is susceptible to dictionary (or “brute force”)
attacks wherein a hacker feeds all possible combinations into the algorithm to
deduce the password and decrypt the data. 145
Symmetric encryption also involves the use of a fixed algorithm and key, but
unlike cryptographic hash, symmetric encryption is a two-way encryption in which
both the creator and the reader use the same key and algorithm to encrypt and
decrypt.146 Since the key is the same for both the creator and the reader, this system
relies on the secrecy of the key. 147 If the key is compromised, a hacker can gain
access to the data and wreak the sort of havoc experienced by the Surgeons of Lake
County.
Asymmetric encryption, which serves as the basis of PKI authentication, creates
two distinct but mathematically related keys for the creator and reader. 148 Just as in
PKI, these two keys are called the “public” and “private” keys. 149 The reader key

138

See generally 45 C.F.R. 164.308(a)(1) (2013); See also FEDERAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 7.
139
John Moehrke, Thoughts on Goal III of the ONC HealthIT Strategic Plan, HEALTHCARE
SECURITY/PRIVACY BLOG (Mar. 31, 2011), http://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/2011/03/
thoughts-on-goal-iii-of-onc-healthit.html.
140

FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 52.

141

Id. at 54.

142

Id.

143

Id. For instance, if hashes are obtained from key operating system binaries when the
system is first installed, the hashes can be compared to subsequently obtained hashes to
determine whether any binaries were changed. Id.
144

Id.

145

Id. To protect against that attack, “salt,” or additional bits, are added to the password
before encryption. The addition of these bits forces attackers to increase the dictionary to
include all possible additional bits, thereby making it more difficult to crack the password. Id.
146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

2014]

HACKING HEALTH CARE: AUTHENTIFICATION SECURITY

253

must be recognized by the creator key in order for the data to be converted into a
digestible form.150
Encryption is not a cure all security solution and can in fact weaken a system’s
security if used inappropriately. 151 For example, security measures which require the
regular scanning of network data (i.e., anti-virus software) can be frustrated by
encryption.152 Thus, viruses embedded in encrypted data can go undetected. 153
Encryption also raises the specter of data becoming unavailable should any
irregularities occur in data handling or delivery. 154 This presents a substantial risk in
the health care context. If a financial institution is unable to access encrypted data,
the user may suffer inconvenience or, at worst, lose some money. If a health care
emergency medical provider is unable to access an EHR to discover a drug allergy,
that inconvenience could cost a life.
IV. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
Based on this review of current regulations, one of the key distinctions between
authentication security regulation in the financial and health care industries is the
level of guidance provided to covered entities. HIPAA has provided more vague
concepts of what is or is not appropriate, but without a more detailed analytical
structure the process of risk analysis quickly devolves into a guessing game with
harsh consequences for wrong answers. 155
The complexities and practical realities of health care information technology
cannot serve as a deterrent or excuse for failing to provide clearer security standards.
Specifically, the financial sector appears to have a much clearer picture of what the
minimum standards, or “ground floor,” expectations are for authentication measures.
By setting a more sophisticated ground floor of security in healthcare systems, many
of the recent attacks on healthcare entities by hackers could have been avoided.
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In adopting the HITECH Act's penalty scheme, the Department recognized that
section 13410(d) contained apparently inconsistent language (i.e., its reference to two
penalty tiers “for each violation,” each of which provided a penalty amount “for all
such violations” of an identical requirement or prohibition in a calendar year). To
resolve this inconsistency, with the exception of violations due to willful neglect that
are not timely corrected, the IFR adopted a range of penalty amounts between the
minimum given in one tier and the maximum given in the second tier for each
violation and adopted the amount of $1.5 million as the limit for all violations of an
identical provision of the HIPAA rules in a calendar year. For violations due to willful
neglect that are not timely corrected, the IFR adopted the penalty amount of $50,000
as the minimum for each violation and $1.5 million for all such violations of an
identical requirement or prohibition in a calendar year.
Id.
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Perhaps just as important, clearer standards would allow the Office of Civil Rights to
more effectively enforce those standards.156
The question then necessarily becomes, “what should be the ground floor?” The
most direct way to address this problem is to raise the baseline security standards for
encryption and authentication security. These new encryption and authentication
security standards must be set forth in a way that is consistent with the flexible
framework that currently pervades HIPAA. This will necessarily require a balancing
between providing strict standards and allowing covered entities adequate discretion
to implement those standards in a manner that suits their needs and resources.
The first proposed amendment is changing encryption of ePHI from an
“addressable” measure to a “required” measure. Covered entities who utilize
networked devices, that is, devices that are capable of transmitting ePHI over the
internet, would be required to encrypt that data to ensure the data cannot be viewed
by a hacker who gains remote access to the server. This is the most effective security
framework available and is consistent with the other major proposed amendment that
requires three-step authentication.
Some covered entities may argue that an encryption requirement is overly
burdensome. This is in part a concern about the strain encryption can place on a
computer’s processing speed. While this may be a concern for older computers,
modern technology is trending toward more efficient processing that makes
encryption more affordable.157 Further, HHS already recommends encryption
utilization as a way to ensure compliance with security requirements. 158 HHS also
notes that smaller to mid-size practices are specifically being targeted by hackers
because they tend to adopt only the bare minimum of security requirements. 159 By
making encryption an essential part of all EHR software, hackers will have to look
elsewhere to gain easy access to sensitive personal information. When encryption is
already the industry norm, and technology is moving to support EHR encryption,
there appears little chance of a technological retreat in encryption technology. The
most logical step is to establish encryption as a basic element of EHR security by
requiring all covered entities to utilize it.
The second proposed amendment is to “require” three-step authentication to
access ePHI. HHS has already “strongly encouraged” three-step authentication to
protect HER, and three-step authentication is required in the financial industry. 160
Three-step authentication also utilizes a PKI framework that has proven to be the
most effective at preventing unauthorized intrusions.
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At first glance, requiring three-step authentication may seem inconsistent with
the flexible standards throughout HIPAA. Three-step authentication is a more strict
requirement than merely any “reasonable and appropriate measure,” but it still
allows for considerable discretion in determining the level of sophistication a
covered entity could implement. As outlined in the previous section, current banking
regulations allow financial institutions to choose from two of three general means of
authentication: (1) something the user knows, (2) something the user has, and (3)
something the user “is.” By leaving it up to the covered entity to decide which two
means to implement, the costs and burdens associated with a three-step
authentication system become very flexible. For example, a large covered entity with
huge stores of ePHI and sophisticated resources could require both a password and
biometric authentication, such as fingerprint or retinal scans, to access its network. A
smaller practice can opt for the much simpler and cost-effective password and key
card combination.
With any increased security standard there is a legitimate concern that healthcare
providers will be forced to divert valuable time and monetary resources away from
patient care and into compliance efforts. But increased security standards do not
necessarily distract providers from their primary role as caregivers. In fact, thirdparty EHR vendors, not providers, will bear most of the burden of these proposed
changes. A recent survey by Software Advice, a group which conducts consumer
research on software products, revealed that just five EHR software vendors enjoy an
eighty-five percent market share among outpatient physicians who utilize EHR
technology.161 The largest provider, Epic, provided roughly twenty percent of
outpatient EHR software.162 The Epic website states that 760,000 patient records are
exchanged each month on its servers.163 Given this concentration of market share,
compliance with the regulations will primarily fall on these few major EHR vendors
who specialize in information technology security and are in the best position to
implement the new requirements across the industry.
Finally, if quality patient care is the ultimate goal of healthcare, then the costs
associated with raising security standards for encryption and authentication under
HIPAA are outweighed by the increase in consumer trust that will follow
implementation. As noted earlier, there is still considerable skepticism among
patients about the overall security of EHR technology. 164 That skepticism can have a
negative impact on the trust relationship between a provider and patient. The level of
trust a patient has in his or her provider has been linked to the overall quality of
care.165 Bringing HIPAA security standards into the twenty-first century
demonstrates to healthcare consumers that their ePHI security is taken seriously and
that EHR technology should be a source of promise, not fear.
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Given the above analysis, the following are proposed modifications to current
HIPAA technical safeguards provided in 45 C.F.R. § 164.312. These new minimum
standards can achieve needed security minimums without overly burdening EHR
developers or the health care providers, and patients who utilize EHRs.
45 C.F.R. § XXXX
§ XXXX Definitions
As used in this part, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) Authentication: A system, technology, or process that ensures the
integrity, security, and authenticity of electronic transactions of
Protected Health Information conducted via an unsecured, public
network.
(b) Protected Health Information: includes individually identifiable
health information
(1) That is:
(i) Transmitted by electronic media;
(ii) Maintained in electronic media; or
(iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.
(2) Protected health information excludes individually identifiable
health information:
(i) In education records covered by the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g;
(ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv);
(iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as
employer; and
(iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50
years.
(c) Electronic Protected Health Information: means information that
comes within (1)(i), (1) (ii), or (1)(iii) of this section.
(d) Transaction: means the transmission of information between two
parties to carry out financial or administrative activities related to health
care. It includes the following types of information transmissions:
(1) Health care claims or equivalent encounter information.
(2) Health care payment and remittance advice.
(3) Coordination of benefits.
(4) Health care claim status.
(5) Enrollment and disenrollment in a health plan.
(6) Eligibility for a health plan.
(7) Health plan premium payments.
(8) Referral certification and authorization.
(9) First report of injury.
(10) Health claims attachments.
(11) Other transactions that the Secretary may prescribe by regulation.
(e) Implementation specification: means specific requirements or
instructions for implementing a standard.
§ 164.312 Technical Safeguards.
A covered entity must:
(a)
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(1) Standard: Access control. Implement technical policies and
procedures for electronic information systems that maintain electronic
protected health information to allow access only to those persons or
software programs that have been granted access rights.
(2) Implementation specifications:
(i) Unique user identification (Required). Assign a unique name
and/or number for identifying and tracking user identity.
(ii) Emergency access procedure (Required). Establish (and
implement as needed) procedures for obtaining necessary
electronic protected health information during an emergency.
(iii) Automatic logoff (Required). Implement electronic procedures
that terminate an electronic session after a predetermined time
of inactivity.
(iv) Encryption and decryption (Required). Implement a
mechanism to encrypt and decrypt electronic protected health
information.
(b) Standard: Audit controls. Implement hardware, software, and/or
procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in information
systems that contain or use electronic protected health information.
(c)
(1) Standard: Integrity. Implement policies and procedures to protect
electronic protected health information from improper alteration or
destruction.
(2) Implementation specification: Mechanism to authenticate
electronic protected health information (Required). Implement
electronic mechanisms to corroborate that electronic protected
health information has not been altered or destroyed in an
unauthorized manner.
(d) Standard: Person or entity authentication. Implement procedures to
verify that a person or entity seeking access to electronic protected health
information is the one claimed.
(1) Implementation specification: Authentication must utilize a threefactor methodology, that includes at least two of the following:
(i) Something the user knows (i.e., a password)
(ii) Something the user has (i.e., a magnetic identification card)
(iii) Something the is (i.e., a biometric feature such a retinal scan or
fingerprint)
(2) Implementation Specification Public Key Infrastructure
Authentication (addressable): PKI authentication is the preferred
means for authenticating the transmission of all electronic
Protected Health Information over a non-secure network. PKI
should consist of:
(i) A certificate of authority (CA) that both issues and verifies the
digital certificates;
(ii) A registration authority which verifies the identity of users
requesting information from the CA;
(iii) A central directory—i.e. a secure location in which to store
and index keys;
(iv) A certificate management system; and
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(v) A certificate policy.
(e)
(1) Standard: Transmission security. Implement technical security
measures to guard against unauthorized access to electronic
protected health information that is being transmitted over an
electronic communications network consistent with
§ 164.312(d)(2).
(2) Implementation specifications:
(i) Integrity controls (Required). Implement security measures to
ensure that electronically transmitted electronic protected
health information is not improperly modified without
detection until disposed of.
(ii) Encryption (Required). Implement a mechanism to encrypt
electronic protected health information whenever electronic
protected health information is transmitted via a public nonsecure network.
(iii) Assymetric encryption (Addressable): mathematically related
but distinct public keys and private keys should be used for
encryption of electronic protected health information, in
accordance with § 164.312(d)(2) and otherwise whenever
appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
Mobile technology and remote access to ePHI are now the norm in the medical
field. The many advantages of remote access, such as convenience and improved
integration of care, are counterbalanced by increased risk that unauthorized users
will gain access to that information. While heightened regulation cannot stop all
intrusions into ePHI, it can make it harder for hackers to gain access to patient
information by raising the baseline standard for security across the industry. While
current legislation encourages the adoption of some basic security measures, such as
encryption and multi-layer authentication, it fails to make them outright
requirements.
If the healthcare industry is going to move into the twenty-first century, and
realize the dramatic potential of widespread EHR adoption, it must first catch up to
the security norms that prevail in the modern technological landscape. The industry
cannot afford to ease into security by allowing covered entities to utilize outdated
and ineffective security measures until they self-determine that it is reasonable and
appropriate to adopt security technology that is already the norm in a comparable
industry.
The changes proposed in this Note are already basic requirements in the financial
sector where personal financial information is regularly transmitted. These changes
would implement the same basic level of security across the healthcare industry,
while still recognizing the need for individual discretion among covered entities in
determining what measures best fit their needs and budget. These heightened
security standards would not only bring the healthcare industry in line with the
comparable financial industry, but would help improve consumer confidence in
providers that utilize this valuable technology.

